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Note 
 
Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary 
Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social 
Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications 
Nicholas R. Bednar*  
In 2003, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang threatened to 
kill Mauricio Edgardo Valdiviezo-Galdamez for refusing to join 
their gang.1 Two-to-three times a week, gang members shot at 
him, yelling, “Don’t run. Don’t be afraid. Sooner or later you 
will join us.”2 Mauricio filed five separate police reports, but “he 
received no response from the police.”3 In September 2004, 
members of MS-13 kidnapped Mauricio, drove him into the 
mountains of Guatemala, and beat him for five hours.4 The 
gang members told Mauricio that they “were no longer offering 
him the option of joining their gang, and had decided to kill 
him instead.”5 Mauricio escaped. Fearing for his life, he fled to 
the United States in October 2004 and applied for asylum while 
in removal proceedings.6  
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comments and critiques. Thank you also to Emily Scholtes, Rebecca Furdek, 
Laura Farley, Ian Jackson, Mary Scott, and the staff of the Minnesota Law 
Review for their editorial expertise. My sincere appreciation is extended to 
Karianne Jones for her invaluable support and tolerance of my fervorous ram-
blings as I constantly toyed with, overturned, and restructured this Note. To 
my father, Jody Bednar, thank you for teaching me practical skills and com-
mon sense. To my mother, Catherine Hall, thank you for enticing me to learn, 
develop, and ask questions when answers were not readily accessible or ap-
parent. You both tolerated my recurring moving from dwelling to dwelling as I 
traveled the world, changed my path, and achieved new goals. Copyright © 
2015 by Nicholas R. Bednar.  
 1. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 
586 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 587. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 586. 
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An asylum applicant, like Mauricio, must establish that he 
or she was persecuted on one of five grounds: race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.7 Applicants unable to claim asylum on one of the four 
more specific protected grounds—for instance those fleeing 
gang violence,8 victims of female genital mutilation (FGM),9 or 
victims of domestic violence10—claim asylum on the basis of 
membership in a particular social group. These applicants must 
produce evidence showing that their particular social group (1) 
shares an immutable characteristic; (2) is defined with particu-
larity; and (3) is socially distinct.11 Mauricio claimed he was a 
member of a particular social group made of “Honduran youth 
who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have re-
fused to join because they oppose the gangs.”12 
Mauricio’s application was denied by an Immigration 
Judge (IJ), appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), and subsequently remanded by the Third Circuit to al-
low the BIA to distinguish between particularity and social dis-
tinction.13 On February 7, 2014, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA 
used Mauricio’s case to “clarify” its interpretation of the partic-
ular social group standard.14 According to the BIA, particularity 
defines the “outer limits” of the group’s boundaries.15 Social dis-
tinction requires the particular social group to be “perceived as 
a group by society.”16 The applicant has the burden of proof to 
produce corroborating evidence, “such as country conditions re-
 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 588 (claiming “Honduran 
youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but have refused to join be-
cause they oppose the gangs” as a social group). 
 9. See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(claiming “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had 
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice” as a social 
group). 
 10. See, e.g., Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) 
(claiming “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship” as a social group). 
 11. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 12. Id. at 228. 
 13. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 587–88, 608 (“[W]e are hard-
pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of ‘particularity’ 
and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibility.’”). 
 14. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 229. Matter of W-G-R- accom-
panied M-E-V-G- as a companion case and is thoroughly discussed in Part I.B. 
of this Note. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 15. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238 (citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 
F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 16. Id. at 240–42. 
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ports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discrim-
inatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like,” 
demonstrating that the particular social group is socially dis-
tinct.17 Following this discussion, the BIA denied Mauricio’s 
asylum application because his proposed particular social group 
failed to satisfy these “clarif[ied]” elements of particularity and 
social distinction.18 
Rather than clarifying the particular social group stand-
ard, the BIA’s decision in M-E-V-G- creates a game of seman-
tics that requires an applicant to navigate the fine line between 
social distinction and particularity. As the National Immigrant 
Justice Center (NIJC) suggests, an applicant cannot easily de-
fine a particular social group that satisfies both particularity 
and social distinction.19 If the applicant defines her group too 
discretely, the group may fail to satisfy the element of social 
distinction because the society in question is unlikely to per-
ceive it as a group. But an amorphous or overbroad particular 
social group, according to BIA precedent, fails the requirement 
of particularity. To avoid denial of her application due to a lack 
of either particularity or social distinction, the applicant must 
define her particular social group with calculated wording. 
If the applicant succeeds in articulating an acceptable par-
ticular social group, she will still need to present evidence that 
the particular social group is recognizable to the society in 
question. This evidence—mostly in the form of expert witness-
es—is largely unavailable to pro se asylum applicants.20 As 
such, the BIA’s current interpretations of social distinction and 
particularity result in unnecessarily high bars for pro se asy-
lum applicants. Furthermore, the need for sociological evidence 
is inconsistent with BIA precedent, which, prior to M-E-V-G-, 
avoided defining particularity in a manner that would require 
 
 17. Id. at 244. 
 18. Id. at 249 (relying on Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- in con-
cluding that “the applicant’s membership in a particular social group was not 
established because he did not show that the proposed group was sufficiently 
particular or socially distinct”).  
 19. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF M-E-V-G- AND 
MATTER OF W-G-R- 5 (2014) [hereinafter NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY], https:// 
www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC%20PSG% 
20Practice%20Advisory_ Final_3.4.14.pdf. 
 20. See generally Sarah R. Goodman, Note, Asking for Too Much? The 
Role of Corroborating Evidence in Asylum Proceedings in the United States 
and United Kingdom, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1733 (2013) (concluding that 
United States evidence requirements for immigration are unrealistic given the 
situation of refugees). 
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“sociological analysis.”21  
Scholars and immigrant rights activists contend that the 
most effective way to reduce prejudice to pro se applicants is to 
eliminate the elements of particularity and social distinction 
from the particular social group standard.22 Yet the opinion in 
M-E-V-G- makes clear that the BIA has no intention of aban-
doning these elements. Consequently, this Note proposes an al-
ternative precedential fact-finding regime, based on the United 
Kingdom’s Country Guidance System, to eliminate the burden 
on pro se applicants of producing sociological evidence in many 
asylum adjudications. Part I begins by evaluating the eviden-
tiary standards of the United States and United Kingdom asy-
lum systems. It then describes the evolution of the particular 
social group standard in United States case law. Part II ana-
lyzes the new undue burdens created by the elements of partic-
ularity and social distinction on pro se applicants. This analysis 
concludes that the implicit requirement of sociological evidence 
prevents pro se applicants from defining a satisfactory particu-
lar social group. Part III proposes a system of precedent-setting 
cases—similar to the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance Sys-
tem—that provide standardized evidence and factual findings 
in certain types of asylum claims to decrease the systemic prej-
udices against pro se applicants. The BIA would frame these 
decisions around particular forms of persecution or countries, 
to allow the courts to compare asylum claims against prede-
termined, authoritative sets of country conditions.23 Such a sys-
tem overcomes the restrictively high standards of particularity 
and social distinction without requiring a change in the defini-
tion of particular social group. 
 
 21. Compare Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244 (requiring appli-
cants to present “evidence such as country conditions reports, expert witness 
testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical 
animosities, and the like” to establish “particularity”), with Matter of S-E-G-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (quoting Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)) (noting that the Second Circuit in Ucelo-Gomez v. 
Mukasey declined to find that “wealth” satisfied the “particularity” require-
ment, as it “would necessitate a sociological analysis as to how persons with 
various assets would have been viewed by others in their country”). 
 22. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 23. See generally CM Zimbabwe CG, [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) (establishing 
country guidance for Zimbabwe political claims); MK Albania CG, [2009] 
UKAIT 36 (protecting Albanian lesbians); RT Sri Lanka CG, [2008] UKAIT 9 
(establishing guidance for medical reports and scarring in asylum claims); 
Robert Thomas, Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and 
the Asylum Process in the United Kingdom, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 489 (2008) 
(explaining the country guidance system in the United Kingdom). 
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I.  THE INCREASING DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING A 
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP   
Before analyzing how the BIA’s interpretation of particu-
larity and social distinction has resulted in unreasonably high 
burdens for pro se applicants, it is imperative to understand 
how the definition has evolved. As a preface to this history, 
Section A provides a brief look into the inherent procedural 
burdens in the United States asylum procedures and the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s solution to these problems. Section B addresses 
the evolution of the definition of particular social group in the 
United States from the inception of the immutable characteris-
tic standard to the addition of social visibility and particularity. 
It then describes how the BIA changed social visibility and par-
ticularity in M-E-V-G- and subsequent cases. 
A. UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM ASYLUM  
PROCEDURES 
To examine the evidentiary difficulties of proving particu-
larity and social distinction, one must first understand the in-
herent procedural burdens in the United States immigration 
system. Subsection 1 examines two barriers to asylum for pro 
se applicants: the lack of counsel and the evidentiary burden of 
proof. As this Note ultimately argues for the adoption of an al-
ternative precedential fact-finding system, Subsection 2 sur-
veys the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System. Later in 
this Note, Part III expands on this background and argues that 
the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System, while partial-
ly flawed, serves as an ideal template for a similar United 
States precedential fact-finding system.24 
1. Asylum Law in the United States 
Like many countries, the United States derives its defini-
tion of “refugee” from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees.25 Indeed, the 1980 Refugee Act adopted a defi-
 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Some countries, such as Sweden, have 
expanded the definition of refugee to protect groups persecuted on account of 
other grounds, including gender and sexual orientation. See, e.g., 4 ch. 1 
§ Utlänningslag (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2005:716) (Swed.). At least 
one piece of forthcoming scholarship suggests that the United States should 
expand its own refugee definition to encompass gender. See generally Tina 
Zedginidze, Note, Domestic Abuse and Gang Violence Against Women: Expand-
ing the Particular Social Group Finding in Matter of A-R-C-G- to Grant Asy-
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nition of refugee analogous to the Convention’s definition:  
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationali-
ty. . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion . . . .26 
To obtain asylum in the United States, applicants must 
persuade the adjudicator that they meet all of the elements of 
the above definition—including persecution on account of one of 
the five protected grounds. The identity of the adjudicator de-
pends on whether or not the applicant applies for asylum af-
firmatively or defensively. Applicants not in removal proceed-
ings apply affirmatively to United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) and appear before an asylum of-
ficer for a non-adversarial interview.27 Applicants in removal 
proceedings may apply defensively before an IJ as a defense to 
removal.28 Unlike in affirmative asylum proceedings, removal 
proceedings before an IJ are adversarial and the applicant 
must contend against an attorney from United States Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE).29 
Both affirmative and defensive proceedings present asylum 
applicants with numerous legal, linguistic, and economic barri-
ers—many of which are outside the scope of this Note.30 Moreo-
 
lum to Women Persecuted by Gangs, 34 J. L. & INEQ. (forthcoming 2016) (en-
couraging the Department of Justice to propose legislation to incorporate gen-
der as a sixth protected ground that could later be adopted by Congress). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (emphasis added). Compare id. (provid-
ing for the five protected grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion), with Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152 (providing for 
the same five protected grounds), and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (defining “refugee” as “any person 
within the definition of article 1 of the Convention [Relating to the Status of 
Refugees]”). 
 27. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b). 
 28. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b). 
 29. See DEP’T OF JUST., THE IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 9 
(2009) (“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enforces the immigra-
tion and nationality laws and represents the United States government’s in-
terests in immigration proceedings . . . . DHS is entirely separate from the De-
partment of Justice and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. When 
appearing before an Immigration Court, DHS is deemed a party to the pro-
ceedings and is represented by its component, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE).”). 
 30. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990) (describ-
ing asylum seekers as “poor, illiterate people who do not speak English and 
are unable to retain counsel”). For a more thorough analysis of procedural 
burdens, see generally Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detri-
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ver, unlike in criminal proceedings,31 the government does not 
provide affirmative or defensive asylum applicants with legal 
representation.32 While the asylum application instructions 
provide information for obtaining pro bono counsel,33 one study 
suggests only 7% of individuals in removal proceedings are ac-
tually represented by pro bono counsel or a nonprofit legal ser-
vice organization.34 In 2013, 41% of individuals appeared before 
the IJ without representation.35 In affirmative proceedings be-
fore USCIS, two-thirds of asylum applicants lack representa-
tion.36 Unfortunately for pro se applicants, representation is 
critical to the success of an asylum application. Applicants rep-
resented by an attorney before the IJ have a 45.6% grant rate, 
compared to the 16.3% grant rate for pro se individuals.37 With-
out counsel, pro se applicants must rely on the asylum applica-
tion instructions and pro se manuals provided by non-profit or-
ganizations—neither of which provides sufficient guidance on 
defining a particular social group that conforms to the expecta-
 
mental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 61 (2009). 
 31. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that 
criminal defendants have a right to counsel). Removal proceedings are not 
criminal proceedings. As determined by the Supreme Court, “deportation is 
not a punishment for crime,” it is a civil proceeding. See Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The proceeding before a United 
States judge . . . is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or of-
fense. It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the 
fact whether the conditions exist upon which congress has enacted that an al-
ien of this class may remain within the country. The order of deportation is 
not a punishment for crime. . . . He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the provisions of the Con-
stitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no applica-
tion.”). 
 32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privi-
lege of being represented, at no expense to the Government . . . .”); U.S. CITI-
ZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0067, I-589, APPLICATION FOR 
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS 4 (2012) [herein-
after I-589 INSTRUCTIONS] (“You have a right to provide your own legal repre-
sentation at an asylum interview . . . at no cost to the U.S. government.”). 
 33. I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32 (providing a phone number and 
website to obtain information on the availability of pro bono counsel).  
 34. New York Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: 
The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 381 (2011) [hereinafter NYIRS Justice].  
 35. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK (2014), http:// 
www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf. 
 36. See Settlage, supra note 30, at 81. 
 37. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007). 
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tions of the BIA.38 
In addition, applicants applying for asylum on the basis of 
membership in a particular social group encounter evidentiary 
barriers—shrouded by a decade of convoluted case law39—that 
often prevent them from proving the social distinction of their 
particular social group before the asylum officer or the IJ.40 The 
adjudicator determines the existence of a particular social 
group on a “case-by-case basis.”41 The applicant has the burden 
to produce country condition evidence—documentary or testi-
monial evidence describing the situation in the foreign coun-
try—that the proposed particular social group meets the crite-
ria of an immutable characteristic, particularity, and social 
distinction.42 The applicant may rely solely on testimony, but 
testimony “may nonetheless fail to satisfy an applicant’s bur-
den of proof.”43 As IJs and asylum officers are not country con-
dition experts,44 they may, and often do require, the applicant 
to submit corroborating evidence.45  
Traditionally, applicants represented by counsel submit as 
 
 38. See I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2 (failing to list the ele-
ments of a particular social group); see, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES, PRO SE MANUAL (2013), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/ 
CGRS_Pro_Se_DV_Manual_English_2014_FINAL.pdf (providing brief descrip-
tions of immutable characteristic, particularity, and social visibility require-
ments, but only in the context of gender violence).  
 39. See infra Part I.B. 
 40. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 41. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 227 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on 
other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“[A]pplicant must establish . . . 
membership in a particular social group . . . was or will be at least one central 
reason for persecuting the applicant.”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 
244. Notably, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding in immigration 
proceedings. See Garry Malphrus, Expert Witnesses in Immigration Proceed-
ings, 4 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 2–3 (May 2010); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576 
F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 43. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY PART 
IV: BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARDS OF PROOF, AND EVIDENCE PARTICIPANT 
WORKBOOK 6–7 (2006) [hereinafter USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING], http://www 
.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26% 
20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Burden-of-Proof-Standards 
-Proof-Evidence-31aug01.pdf. 
 44. See Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006) (“An IJ is not 
an expert on conditions in any given country . . . .”). 
 45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“[W]here it is reasonable to expect corroborating 
evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s 
claim, such evidence should be provided . . . .”). The affirmative asylum pro-
cess is more forgiving, as the asylum officer is required to research country 
conditions. See USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 23. 
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country condition evidence the United States Department of 
State Human Rights Report, news articles, witness affidavits, 
and personal documentation.46 Notably, the State Department 
report is often given substantial weight over other evidence, 
despite concerns that these reports are “generalized summaries 
of recent country conditions”47 and that “the [State] Department 
softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United 
States wants to have good relations with.”48 In order to rebut an 
IJ or BIA finding based on the State Department report the ap-
plicant will need to produce “a highly credible independent 
source of expert knowledge.”49 If the applicant fails to submit 
the requisite evidence, the adjudicator may find that the appli-
cant has failed to meet her burden of proof.50  
If her application is denied by an IJ, an applicant may ap-
peal to the BIA.51 The BIA is not permitted to engage in de novo 
fact-finding,52 though it may “tak[e] administrative notice” of 
“current events or the contents of official documents.”53 Under 
current regulations, BIA decisions are precedential only with 
regard to findings of law.54 Therefore, adjudicators require each 
applicant to independently submit the necessary corroborating 
evidence to establish their claim regardless of whether or not 
adjudicators granted asylum in previous cases with a similar 
factual basis.  
While experienced immigration attorneys are aware of the-
se evidentiary requirements, USCIS makes little effort to notify 
pro se applicants of the true legal requirements—defined only 
by case law—of an asylum application based on membership in 
a particular social group. Neither the asylum application nor 
its instructions list the three elements of a particular social 
group—immutability, particularity, and social distinction.55 
Moreover, the application neither provides a space, nor 
 
 46. USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 17–20. 
 47. Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on 
America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 7 (2007). 
 48. Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 49. Id. at 620. 
 50. Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 733 (“The ‘absence of such corrobo-
rating evidence’ alone supports a finding that ‘an applicant has failed to meet 
her burden of proof.’”). 
 51. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(9) (2014). 
 52. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii). 
 53. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). 
 54. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (g). 
 55. See I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2 (failing to list the ele-
ments of a particular social group). 
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prompts the applicant to define their particular social group.56 
While the instructions inform the applicant to submit corrobo-
rating evidence showing country conditions and individualized 
facts, nowhere do they suggest the applicant should submit so-
ciological evidence establishing the recognition of the particular 
social group within the society.57 
The sheer amount of evidence that applicants must submit 
in every claim has led jurists to criticize the lack of precedential 
fact-finding in United States asylum adjudications. In Banks v. 
Gonzales, Judge Easterbrook criticized the BIA for failing to 
provide expert evidence. Instead, he suggested that “[w]hat the 
immigration bureaucracy needs is a[n] [expert] . . . for each 
country.”58 As Judge Easterbrook noted, while the individual-
ized facts of a particular social group claim vary from appli-
cant-to-applicant, the overall country conditions and recogni-
tion of the group often do not: 
  Many disputes about asylum are recurring and could be resolved 
once and for all by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney 
General, and their delegates . . . . While Taylor ruled Liberia, all eth-
nic Krahns (and Unity Party supporters) should have been treated 
the same way. Similarly, adherents to the Ahmadi sect either are or 
are not persecuted in Pakistan . . . . Many asylum claims similarly 
could be handled by the sort of detailed regulations that the Social 
Security Administration uses. Others, of the kind that arise less fre-
quently, could be resolved with the assistance of country specialists 
along the lines of vocational experts. What cannot continue, however, 
is administrative refusal to take a standing on recurring questions, 
coupled with the reliance on IJs to fill in for the expertise missing 
from the record. The immigration bureaucracy has much to learn 
from the experience of other federal agencies that handle large num-
bers of comparable claims with individual variations.
59
 
As Judge Easterbrook recognized, the United States immi-
gration system needs some form of precedential fact-finding 
that allows for speedy adjudication of similar claims and elimi-
nates the need for individual applicants to produce the sociolog-
ical evidence necessary to satisfy the element of social distinc-
tion.  
 
 56. See id. at 4. 
 57. See id. at 7–8 (“You must submit reasonably available corroborative 
evidence showing (1) the general conditions in the country from which you are 
seeking asylum, and (2) the specific facts on which you are relying to support 
your claim. . . . Supporting evidence may include but is not limited to newspa-
per articles, affidavits of witnesses or experts, medical and/or psychological 
records, doctors’ statements, periodicals, journals, books, photographs, official 
documents, or personal statements or live testimony from witnesses or ex-
perts.”). 
 58. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 59. Id. at 454–55. 
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2. The United Kingdom Country Guidance System 
The similarities between United States and United King-
dom asylum law facilitate easy comparison. Like the United 
States, the United Kingdom derives its definition of “refugee” 
from the 1951 Refugee Convention.60 However, unlike the Unit-
ed States, the United Kingdom engages in precedential fact-
finding through its Country Guidance System. Reminiscent of 
Judge Easterbrook’s own frustrations, Lord Justice Sedley, 
Judge of the Court of Appeals of England and Wales, explained 
that asylum law is not simply the application of facts to a legal 
standard, but “a global appraisal of an individual’s past and 
prospective situation in a particular cultural, social, political 
and legal milieu, judged by a test which, though it has legal 
and linguistic limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.”61 
Such an appraisal is unwieldy when an adjudicator must en-
gage in this “global appraisal” on a case-by-case basis. As such, 
the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System addresses 
some of the evidentiary concerns for pro se asylum applicants 
discussed above in Subsection 1. 
Adopted in 2003, the Country Guidance System produces 
decisions that advise lower courts “on how asylum appeals from 
a particular country are to be approached by decision mak-
ers.”62 The process of issuing a Country Guidance Determina-
tion begins when the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigra-
tion Tribunal (AIT) identifies an appeal that requires broader 
country condition examination.63 The Tribunal frames the issue 
in one of three ways: (1) the conditions of a particular country; 
(2) the risk of a particular group; or (3) risk factors used to 
evaluate whether an individual is at risk of persecution.64  
Once the Tribunal frames the issue, the asylum appellant 
and the Home Office present substantial country condition evi-
dence and country-specific experts before a three judge panel.65 
 
 60. Accord The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations, (2006) § 2 (UK) (“‘[R]efugee’ means a person who 
falls within Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention . . . .”); UNHCR—About Us, 
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Oct. 15, 
2015) (referring to the 1951 Refugee Convention as the “Geneva Refugee Con-
vention”). This Note avoids using the term Geneva Convention to avoid confu-
sion with the other Geneva Conventions. 
 61. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Shah [1997] Imm.A.R. 145, 153 (HC). 
 62. Thomas, supra note 23, at 490. 
 63. See id. at 502–03. 
 64. See id. at 511–14. 
 65. See id. at 494. 
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Procedurally, it is difficult to classify the presentation of coun-
try condition evidence in the United Kingdom system as strictly 
adversarial or inquisitorial. Professor Robert Thomas, an ex-
pert on the United Kingdom asylum process, best explains the 
difference between traditional appellate decisions and Country 
Guidance Determinations:  
Traditionally, this has been an adversarial appellate jurisdic-
tion . . . . However, the task of producing authoritative country guid-
ance is of a different nature from that of determining individual asy-
lum appeals. If the Tribunal were strictly confined to the body of 
evidence presented before it by the parties, even though it was aware 
that this omitted other potentially material evidence, then this would 
undermine the whole purpose of producing authoritative guidance. 
The country guidance exercise can therefore assume “something of an 
inquisitorial quality, although the adversarial structure of the appeal 
procedure of course remains.” In this respect, much may depend upon 
the awareness of the senior judges of recent country information and 
the discussion between the parties at pre-hearing reviews concerning 
the sources of country information to be relied upon.
66
 
Following this mixed adversarial-inquisitorial fact-finding 
exercise, the Tribunal issues an opinion with broad findings of 
fact applicable to asylum claims stemming from similar cir-
cumstances.67 Unlike BIA decisions in the United States, the 
factual findings of a United Kingdom Country Guidance De-
termination are binding on lower courts, as long as it “(a) re-
lates to the country guidance issue in question; and (b) depends 
upon the same or similar evidence.”68 Appellants may challenge 
the Country Guidance Determination as an error of law or 
based on evidence that it has been “superseded by a change in 
country conditions or that new evidence has come to light.”69 
While the Country Guidance System promotes efficiency 
and consistency in asylum adjudications, it is not without its 
faults. First, practitioners have attacked the Tribunal’s failure 
to explain how it weighs evidence when making its decision.70 
 
 66. Id. at 509. 
 67. Cf. CM Zimbabwe CG, [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) (examining country 
guidance for Zimbabwe political claims); AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445 
(IAC) (discussing asylees from Somalia); MK Albania CG, [2009] UKAIT 36 
(establishing country guidance for Albanian lesbians); RT Sri Lanka CG, 
[2008] UKAIT 9 (establishing guidance for medical reports and scarring in 
asylum claims). 
 68. TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, PRACTICE DIRECTIONS: IMMIGRATION & ASY-
LUM CHAMBERS OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL AND THE UPPER TRIBUNAL 
¶ 12.2 (2014) (U.K.) [hereinafter PRACTICE DIRECTIONS], http://www.judiciary 
.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/revised-pd-3112014.pdf. 
 69. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505. 
 70. See IMMIGRATION ADVISORY SERV., COUNTRY GUIDELINE CASES: BE-
NIGN AND PRACTICAL? 38–39 (Colin Yeo ed., 2005), http://www.freemovement 
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Second, the risks of poor decision-making in a country guidance 
case are higher than in an individualized claim, as the result-
ing precedent has the potential to affect an entire class of asy-
lum seekers.71 Finally, country guidance decisions issued to 
date tend to be negative to the asylum appellant—limiting ra-
ther than expanding protection for future applicants.72 These 
flaws, however, do not deprive the United Kingdom Country 
Guidance System of the protection it provides to asylum appli-
cants otherwise unable to produce thorough country condition 
evidence. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF PARTICULAR  
SOCIAL GROUP 
Since 2006, the BIA has continued to tighten the require-
ments of the particular social group formulation.73 Subsection 1 
discusses the BIA’s adoption of the Acosta standard in 1985, 
which required members of the particular social group to share 
a common immutable characteristic.74 For two decades, federal 
circuit courts and other common law nations embraced the 
Acosta standard.75 As Subsection 2 reveals, in 2006 the BIA be-
gan requiring applicants to define their particular social group 
with particularity and social visibility. Legal scholars and the 
Seventh Circuit have resisted the BIA’s addition of these ele-
ments. Finally, Subsection 3 recounts the BIA’s more recent de-
cisions in 2014—Matter of M-E-V-G-, Matter of W-G-R-, and 
Matter of A-R-C-G-—applying the newest elements to the par-
ticular social group formulation. Despite the hopeful outcome in 
A-R-C-G-, the BIA’s most recent particular social group case, 
the reformulation of “particularity” and “social distinction” in 
M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- erects evidentiary barriers that cannot 
be overcome by pro se applicants. 
 
.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Country-Guideline-cases-benign-and 
-practical.pdf. 
 71. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 498. 
 72. See id. at 523. 
 73. See infra Part I.B.2–3. 
 74. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985), over-
ruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 
1987). 
 75. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” 
in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum 
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 
48–49 (2008). 
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1. The Acosta Standard 
At the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons, the Swedish delegation 
urged the inclusion of particular social groups in the refugee 
definition. They noted, “[s]uch cases existed, and it would be as 
well to mention them explicitly.”76 As previously mentioned, the 
United States implemented the 1951 Refugee Convention defi-
nition—and its five protected grounds—in the 1980 Refugee 
Act. Yet neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1980 Refugee Act 
explicitly define particular social group.77 Furthermore, the leg-
islative history surrounding the 1980 Refugee Act ignores the 
meaning of particular social group, favoring instead wholesale 
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition.78 Without 
this statutory or legislative guidance, the BIA and circuit 
courts have struggled to develop a consistent—and coherent—
definition of particular social group. 
In 1986, Matter of Acosta presented the BIA with the first 
opportunity to interpret the phrase “particular social group.” 
The BIA—citing the lack of guidance and using the interpreta-
tive canon of ejusdem generis79—adopted the immutable charac-
teristic standard.80 Under the immutable characteristic stand-
ard, members of a particular social group must share “a 
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual 
to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or con-
science that it ought not be required to be changed.”81 Support-
 
 76. See Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, UNHCR (Nov. 26, 1951), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cda4 
.html. 
 77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
 78. See Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, supra note 76; Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at 
Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social 
Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 513–14 (1993). 
 79. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“We find the well-
established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, ‘of the same kind,’ 
to be most helpful in construing the phrase ‘membership in a particular social 
group.’ That doctrine holds that general words used in an enumeration with 
specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific 
words . . . . Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerated in the Act 
and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either unable 
by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to 
avoid persecution.” (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Matter of 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 80. See id. at 232–34. 
 81. Id. at 233. For a more thorough analysis of the Acosta standard, see 
generally REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER 50–58 (6th ed. 2010); IRA J. 
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ers of the Acosta standard favored its extension of protection to 
otherwise unprotected groups, such as women and homosexu-
als.82 Critics attacked its denial of protection to “groups who 
may well be targets of persecution based on their associations 
that are widely recognized in society.”83 Despite these criti-
cisms, the majority of federal circuits embraced the new stand-
ard.84  
The Acosta standard resulted in expansive protection for 
large and otherwise unprotected groups. For example, in Has-
san v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit accepted “Somali females” 
as a particular social group, finding that “all Somali females 
have a well-founded fear of persecution . . . given the preva-
lence of FGM.”85 Hassan is perhaps the broadest particular so-
cial group an appellate court has ever adopted, but remains il-
lustrative of the potential protection offered by the Acosta 
standard. More representative of common particular social 
groups during the Acosta era, the BIA and circuit courts have 
also accepted particular social groups defined by homosexuali-
ty,86 forced marriage,87 ethnicity,88 and a variety of other immu-
 
KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 559–67 (13th ed. 2012). 
 82. James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Discussion Paper, Membership 
of a Particular Social Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 481–82, 486–90 
(2002) (providing pros and cons of the immutable characteristic test).  
 83. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Percep-
tions: An Analysis of the Meaning of “Membership of a Particular Social 
Group,” in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263, 295 (Erika Fuller et al. 
eds., 2003) (suggesting groups such as students, union members, and profes-
sionals will not be protected under the immutable characteristic standard). 
Adjudicators frequently refuse to recognize “particular social groups” defined 
by employment. Cf. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (deny-
ing asylum to a “campesino cheesemaker”). 
 84. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. INS, 
144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 
1994); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 
F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). But see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574–
75 (9th Cir. 1986) (adopting the “voluntary associational relationship” test). 
Since Sanchez-Truijllo, the Ninth Circuit has shifted more towards the Acosta 
standard. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), 
vacated on other grounds, 409 F.3d 177 (2006); GERMAIN, supra note 81, at 52. 
 85. See Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007). But see 
Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640 (rejecting “Iranian women” as a particular social group 
for being “overbroad”). 
 86. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 
1990). 
 87. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 88. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding Bihari living in Bangladesh to be a particular social group); Ali v. 
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table characteristics.89 The size of the population of the group 
remained irrelevant, so long as the particular social group was 
grounded so deeply in the identity of the individual it would be 
impossible or unreasonable to suggest it should be changed to 
avoid persecution.  
As the critics feared, the BIA and circuit courts rejected 
particular social group claims that demonstrated persecution, 
but failed to meet the immutable characteristic standard. For 
example, the First Circuit rejected “campesino cheesemakers” 
as a particular social group, even though “cheesemakers are 
especially likely to be subjected to guerilla demands for food be-
cause the hard cheese . . . is resistant to spoilage.”90 Deferring 
to the BIA, the First Circuit reasoned employment is something 
that an individual has “the power to change.”91 Thus, Acosta did 
not open the floodgates to any individual able to cognizably al-
lege persecution. Despite these limitations, for two decades 
Acosta broadened protection to asylum seekers while providing 
a coherent standard for adjudicators to apply.  
2. The Addition of the Particularity and Social Visibility Tests 
Most common law countries—in particular Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom—adopted some formulation 
of the immutable characteristic standard derived from Acosta.92 
Australia, however, formulated a social perception test that ex-
amined “whether or not a group shares a common characteris-
tic which makes them a cognizable group or sets them apart 
 
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 784–87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding gang-rape of asylum 
seeker was on account of her membership in the Midgan clan of Somalia); 
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding Bulgarian na-
tional of Roma descent constituted a particular social group).  
 89. See, e.g., Lwin, 144 F.3d at 510–12 (holding that parents of Burmese 
student dissidents constituted a particular social group); Gebremichael v. INS, 
10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a 
social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics 
than that of the nuclear family.”). For a substantial list of additional cases 
finding the existence of a particular social group, see KURZBAN, supra note 81, 
at 563–69. 
 90. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). However, prior to 
Acosta, there is at least one recorded grant of asylum for persecution on ac-
count of “cheesemaking.” Id.  
 91. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding that 
taxi drivers could not constitute a particular social group, because it is within 
the ability of the individual to change his livelihood so as to avoid persecu-
tion), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 
(B.I.A. 1987). 
 92. See Marouf, supra note 75; see also Canada (Attorney-General) v. 
Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Aleinikoff, supra note 83, at 294. 
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from society at large.”93 In an effort to unify the immutable 
characteristic and the social perception tests, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proposed the following 
definition of particular social group in its 2002 Guidelines on 
International Protection: 
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than 
their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by so-
ciety. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangea-
ble, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the 
exercise of one’s human rights.
94
 
 The BIA first toyed with the idea of adding a social percep-
tion element to the Acosta standard as early as 1999—even be-
fore the publication of the UNHCR Guidelines. In Matter of R-
A-, the BIA rejected the particular social group of “Guatemalan 
women who have been intimately involved with Guatemalan 
companions, who believe that women live under male domina-
tion.”95 Skeptical of this particular social group definition, the 
BIA feared the group was created for the purposes of the asy-
lum application and questioned “whether anyone in Guatemala 
perceives this group to exist in any form whatsoever.”96 The 
BIA concluded that “there must also be some showing of how 
the characteristic is understood in the alien’s society, such that 
we, in turn, may understand that the potential persecutors in 
fact see persons sharing the characteristic as warranting sup-
pression or the infliction of harm.”97 Foreshadowing an eventual 
expansion of the particular social group definition, the BIA de-
fended its inclusion of a social perception factor:  
We never declared, however, that the starting point for assessing so-
cial group claims articulated in Acosta was also the ending point. The 
factors we look to in this case, beyond Acosta’s “immutableness” test, 
are not prerequisites, and we do not rule out the use of additional con-
sideration that may properly bear on whether a social group should 
be recognized in an individual case.
98
 
It is clear that at this point in time the BIA did not intend 
to mandate the inclusion of social perception as a required ele-
 
 93. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Guidelines]; see also Applicant A. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs 
(1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.) (rejecting the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of 
Acosta).  
 94. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 93, ¶ 11.  
 95. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 96. Id. at 918. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 917 (emphasis added). 
372 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:355 
 
ment for the particular social group standard. In 2001, the At-
torney General vacated R-A-,99 and the social perception test 
remained dormant for five years. 
In 2006, following the publication of the UNHCR Guide-
lines in 2002, the BIA reinterpreted the particular social group 
standard to explicitly include the elements of social visibility 
and particularity. The BIA discussed these elements for the 
first time in Matter of C-A- while considering a proposed par-
ticular social group of “noncriminal informants.”100 First, the 
BIA determined that “noncriminal informants” “was too loosely 
defined.”101 “‘[N]oncriminal informants’ could potentially in-
clude persons who passed along information concerning any 
numerous guerrilla factions or narco-trafficking cartels cur-
rently active in Colombia . . . . [I]t is important to know the 
persons between whom the information is being provided, as 
well as the nature of the information . . . .”102 Next, the BIA dis-
cussed social visibility, noting that “visibility is an important 
element”103 according to the UNHCR Guidelines.104 The BIA 
found that “noncriminal informants” was not socially visible, 
because informants remain unknown until they are discov-
ered.105  
Echoing C-A-, the BIA reaffirmed its adoption of particu-
larity and social visibility in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- when it 
declined to find that “affluent Guatemalans” met either stand-
ard.106 The BIA held that the particular social group failed the 
social visibility element because criminals “even target persons 
with relatively modest resources or income . . . or other forms of 
wealth” and, therefore, “affluent Guatemalans” are not at a 
greater risk of crime than the general population.107 Moreover, 
the BIA determined that the particular social group was not de-
fined with particularity because “wealthy” and “affluent” are 
“too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for deter-
mining group membership.”108 “Depending upon one’s perspec-
tive, the wealthy may be limited to the very top echelon [or] 
 
 99. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. Jan. 19, 2001). 
 100. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 960. 
 105. Id.  
 106. See Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69–71 (B.I.A. 
2007). 
 107. Id. at 74–75. 
 108. Id. at 76. 
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might include small business owners living a relatively com-
fortable existence in a generally impoverished country.”109 
A year later, in 2008, the BIA developed its most compre-
hensive articulation of social visibility and particularity in Mat-
ter of S-E-G-. First, the BIA defined the test for particularity as 
“whether the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or 
is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining 
group membership.’”110 Importantly, the BIA relied on Ucelo v. 
Mukasey, which held “wealth” and “affluence” to be too subjec-
tive, because they would “necessitate a sociological analysis as 
to how persons with various assets would have been viewed by 
others in their country.”111 Turning to social visibility, the BIA 
determined that the group “should generally be recognizable by 
others in the community and considered in the context of the 
country of concern and the persecution feared.”112 Departing 
from its initial statement in R-A- that factors “beyond Acosta’s 
‘immutableness’ test, are not prerequisites,”113 S-E-G- affirmed 
that particularity and social visibility are required elements, as 
opposed to factors, of the particular social group standard.114 
Legal scholars and the UNHCR have suggested that the 
BIA misinterpreted the UNHCR guidelines in its adoption of 
“particularity” and “social visibility” in C-A-, A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 
and S-E-G-.115 Under the UNHCR Guidelines, only in the ab-
sence of an immutable characteristic should “further analy-
sis . . . be undertaken to determine whether the group is none-
theless perceived as a cognizable group in that society.”116 Legal 
scholars, the United Kingdom, and the UNHCR have read the 
UNHCR definition to permit alternative tests, as opposed to 
dual requirements.117 Both legal scholars and the UNHCR ad-
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008) (emphasis 
added) (citing Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, No. 07-2567, 2008 WL 2630085, at *3 
(8th Cir. July 7, 2008)). 
 111. Id. at 585–86 (citing Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 
2007)). 
 112. Id. at 586. 
 113. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918–20 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 114. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 66; see also A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 69; Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957–60 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 115. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 63 (“[A]lthough the BIA referenced the 
UNHCR Guidelines in both C-A- and A-M-E-, its use of ‘social visibility’ did 
not coincide with the ‘public perception’ approach described above; nor did the 
BIA apply the UNHCR’s approach correctly.”). 
 116. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 93, ¶ 13. 
 117. See Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. K, [2006] 1 AC 412, 432 (U.K.); 
Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as 
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vocated a return to the Acosta standard—or at least the aboli-
tion of social visibility as a required element.118  
Many circuit courts deferred to the BIA’s interpretation 
and adopted particularity and social visibility without issue.119 
The Seventh and Third Circuits, however, remained skeptical 
of adopting social visibility as part of the particular social 
group standard. In Gatimi v. Holder, Judge Posner of the Sev-
enth Circuit refused to accord deference to the BIA’s interpre-
tation of particular social group because “it makes no sense; nor 
has the Board attempted . . . to explain the reasoning behind 
the criterion of social visibility.”120 Posner quipped that the only 
way that asylum applicants could satisfy the social visibility el-
ement is by “pinning a target to their backs.”121 
In 2011, the Third Circuit reviewed Mauricio Edgardo 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s particular social group for the second 
time in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United 
States.122 Reviewing particular social groups accepted under the 
Acosta standard, Chief Judge McKee noted, “If a member of any 
of these groups applied for asylum today, the BIA’s ‘social visi-
bility’ requirement would pose an insurmountable obstacle to 
refugee status, even though the BIA has already held that 
membership in any of these groups qualifies for refugee sta-
 
Amicus Curiae at 5–6, Matter of Thomas, No. A75-597-033 (2007), [hereinafter 
UNHCR Brief] http://www.refworld.org/docid/45c34c244.html; Marouf, supra 
note 75, at 62. 
 118. See UNHCR Brief, supra note 117, at 10 (“The Board in Acosta did not 
require either a ‘social perception’ or ‘social visibility’ test, and the UNHCR 
would caution the Board against adopting such a rigid approach which may 
disregard groups that the Convention is designed to protect.”); Lisa Frydman 
& Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of Asy-
lum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, 12-10 IMMIGR. BRIEF-
INGS 1, 2 (2012) (“[T]his interpretation patently misconstrues the [UNHCR] 
guidelines.”); Marouf, supra note 75, at 103 (arguing that the Acosta standard 
reflects the basic principles of the 1951 Convention); Elyse Wilkinson, Com-
ment, Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social Visibility Re-
quirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 ME. L. REV. 387, 
417 (2010) (“[W]hat is most important is that the BIA clarify that social visi-
bility is not a requirement.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859–62 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 58–60 (1st Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v. 
Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 446 
F.3d 1190, 1194–95, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 120. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 121. Id. at 616. 
 122. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 588 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
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tus . . . .”123 While the Third Circuit had previously accorded the 
BIA Chevron deference for its interpretation of “particular so-
cial group” in Acosta, Chief Judge McKee declared that “this 
did not give the agency license to thereafter adjudicate claims 
of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.”124 Hence, 
the Third Circuit held that the requirement of social visibility 
was not entitled to Chevron deference, because it was incon-
sistent with prior BIA decisions.125 The Third Circuit remanded 
the case to the BIA for further review.126 
3. Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- 
Following the Third Circuit’s decision in Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, the BIA reconsidered Mauricio’s case in Matter of 
M-E-V-G-.127 In doing so, it rejected his particular social group 
defined as “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited 
by gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose the 
gangs.”128 On the same day it announced M-E-V-G-, the BIA al-
so decided Matter of W-G-R-.129 In W-G-R- the BIA denied asy-
lum to an applicant claiming persecution on account of mem-
bership in a particular social group defined as “former members 
of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their 
gang membership.”130 Together, M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- reformu-
lated the BIA’s interpretation of the elements of particularity 
and social distinction, and the evidentiary requirements for 
proving social distinction.131 
According to the BIA, in order to satisfy the element of par-
ticularity, a particular social group must “be discrete and have 
definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, 
diffuse, or subjective.”132 Rather, “[a] particular social group 
must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear bench-
mark for determining who falls within the group.”133 Adjudica-
tors must consider particularity “in the context of the society 
out of which the claim for asylum arises.”134  
 
 123. Id. at 604. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 603–04. 
 126. Id. at 612. 
 127. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228–29 (B.I.A. 2014).  
 128. Id. at 228. 
 129. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 130. Id. at 209. 
 131. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &. N. Dec. at 239–44. 
 132. Id. at 239. 
 133. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214. 
 134. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238. 
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Following its discussions of particularity in M-E-V-G- and 
W-G-R-, the BIA moved to reformulate its understanding of so-
cial visibility. Correcting Posner’s interpretations in Gatimi, 
the BIA noted “[l]iteral or ‘ocular’ visibility is not . . . a prereq-
uisite.”135 Therefore, the BIA rebranded “social visibility” as “so-
cial distinction” to eliminate any such confusion.136 Instead of 
“ocular visibility,” social distinction requires a particular social 
group to “be perceived as a group by society.”137 The perception 
must be of the society in question—not solely the persecutor’s 
perception.138 Though it acknowledged some overlap, the BIA 
disagreed with the Third Circuit’s holding that there is no dif-
ference between particularity and social distinction.139 The BIA 
clarified that particularity addresses the “‘outer limits’ of a 
group’s boundaries,” while social distinction addresses whether 
“society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently sepa-
rate or distinct.”140 
Following this analysis, the BIA disposed of the claim that 
such an interpretation of particular social group would result in 
“significant burdens on the applicant.”141 The BIA drew no dis-
tinction between the evidentiary requirements of an applicant 
who claims persecution based on political opinion and one who 
claims persecution based on membership in a particular social 
group.142 “[T]here must be evidence showing that society in gen-
eral perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the par-
ticular characteristics to be a group.”143 As such, the applicant 
may establish social distinction through corroborating evidence 
“such as country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, 
and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, histori-
cal animosities, and the like.”144 
Of the two cases, W-G-R- offers the more robust application 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 240. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 242–43 (“Only when the inquiry involves the perception of the 
society in question will the ‘membership in a particular social group’ ground of 
persecution be equivalent to the other enumerated grounds of persecution.”). 
 139. Id. at 240; see also Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating the Court was “hard-pressed to dis-
cern any difference between the requirement of ‘particularity’ and the discred-
ited requirement of ‘social visibility’”). 
 140. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (citing Castellano-Chacon 
v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 141. Id. at 244. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 144. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244. 
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of the reformulated particularity and social distinction ele-
ments.145 In assessing particularity, the BIA found “former gang 
membership” was too amorphous, because it “could include per-
sons of any age, sex, or background.”146 “Former gang member-
ship” was “not limited to those who have had a meaningful in-
volvement with the gang” and included those who were 
members of the gang for a short period of time or those consid-
ered a “long-term, hardened gang member.”147 Furthermore, the 
respondent provided insufficient evidence to establish that 
“Salvadoran society considers former gang members . . . a dis-
tinct social group.”148 The BIA rejected a report produced by 
Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic 
“stating that there is a societal stigma against former gang 
members because of their tattoos.”149 Instead, citing the 2008 
State Department report for El Salvador, the BIA concluded 
that Salvadoran society does not distinguish between former 
and active gang members.150 
Commentators criticized the BIA’s discussion of particular-
ity and social distinction. According to the NIJC, particularity 
“effectively precludes the use of common parlance labels to de-
scribe a [particular social group], even as the social distinction 
test requires that a [particular social group] be limited by pa-
rameters a society would recognize.”151 Others claimed the 
BIA’s reinterpretation is contradictory to Acosta and presents 
“equitable challenges” to asylum applicants.152 These advocates 
continue to argue for a return to the Acosta standard.153 
Since M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, the BIA has applied its re-
formulated particularity and social distinction elements in only 
one precedential case. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA case 
to apply M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, the BIA recognized “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation-
 
 145. While the BIA claims to apply these reformulated elements in Matter 
of M-E-V-G-, the BIA essentially cites its analysis in Matter of S-E-G- and 
Matter of E-A-G- and the opinion contains almost no new discussion. Id. at 
249. 
 146. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 222. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19.  
 152. See Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Con-
founding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social Group,” 14-
06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 19 (2014). 
 153. Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Immigration Lawyers Associa-
tion at 18, Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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ship” as a cognizable particular social group.154 A-R-C-G- offered 
an insight into the kind of evidence that may help prove social 
distinction. Cultural evidence of family violence and ineffective 
domestic violence laws persuaded the BIA that the proposed 
particular social group was socially distinct.155 While A-R-C-G- 
is the first BIA decision to accept a particular social group since 
the inception of the particularity and social distinction ele-
ments, it is not evidence that the BIA and circuit courts are 
loosening the rigidity with which they apply these elements.156  
Circuit court decisions have been limited since M-E-V-G- 
and W-G-R- but widely deferential to the BIA.157 The First Cir-
cuit,158 Second Circuit,159 Fourth Circuit,160 Fifth Circuit,161 
Eighth Circuit,162 Ninth Circuit,163 Tenth Circuit,164 and Elev-
enth Circuit,165 have favorably cited to M-E-V-G- or W-G-R- and 
applied the reformulated particularity and social distinction el-
ements. In many of these cases, the circuit court deferred to the 
BIA’s interpretation and remanded the case to the BIA for fur-
ther consideration consistent with M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-.166 At 
the time of writing, the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuits 
have not yet released an opinion analyzing either M-E-V-G- or 
W-G-R-.  
 
 154. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 155. See id. at 394.  
 156. Compare Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–95 (recognizing 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”), 
with Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 249–53 (declining to recognize the 
proposed particular social group “Honduran youth who have been actively re-
cruited by gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs”). 
 157. See Sabrina Damast, How To Define Your Particular Social Group: 
Case Law Developments After Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 20 
BENDER’S IMMIG. BULL. 272, 277 (2015). 
 158. See Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, No. 14-1182, 2015 WL 4560270, at *2–3 
(1st Cir. July 29, 2015). 
 159. See Paloka v. Holder, 762, F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (granting the 
BIA’s interpretation in M-E-V-G- Chevron deference). 
 160. See Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, No. 13-1491, 578 F. App’x 300, 304 
(4th Cir. 2014). 
 161. See Villalobos-Ramirez v. Lynch, 608 F. App’x 261 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 162. See Juarez Chilel v. Holder, 779 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 163. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 164. See Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015) (con-
cluding that M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- are “consistent with [the court’s] past in-
terpretation of social visibility”). 
 165. Chavez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 13-15486, 571 F. App’x 861, 
864–65 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 166. See Damast, supra note 157, at 276 n.55 (“Following its decision in 
Pirir-Boc, the Ninth Circuit remanded dozens of asylum cases involving par-
ticular social groups, citing the evolving case law . . . .”). 
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As newer circuit court cases, A-R-C-G- and M-E-V-G- im-
ply, the BIA and circuit courts are unwilling to dispose of par-
ticularity and social distinction.167 Scholars, NGOs, and the 
Third and Seventh Circuits have raised concerns that these cri-
teria are unworkable and unduly prejudicial toward the asylum 
applicant. While it is difficult to know how adjudicators will 
apply M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, precedent suggests the federal 
circuit courts will be largely deferential to the BIA’s holdings. 
As these elements are now permanent fixtures to the particular 
social group formulation, the BIA must consider the eviden-
tiary burden that particularity and social distinction impose on 
pro se asylum applicants. 
II.  PRO SE PROBLEMS PROVING “PARTICULARITY” AND 
“SOCIAL DISTINCTION”   
Commentators have identified countless problems that so-
cial distinction and particularity pose for asylum applicants. 
Social distinction creates valid concerns that the United States 
is in violation of its international obligations.168 Moreover, the 
addition of social distinction conflicts with prior BIA precedent 
and is therefore unworthy of Chevron deference.169 A thorough 
discussion of these arguments is outside the scope of this Note. 
Instead, this section analyzes the BIA’s current particular so-
cial group requirements with an eye to the difficulties present-
ed to pro se applicants looking to prove their claim. Section A 
examines the problem of producing a definition that satisfies 
the requirement of particularity and remains recognizable to 
 
 167. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[We] will 
clarify our interpretation of the phrase ‘particular social group.’ We adhere to 
our prior interpretations of the phrase but . . . we rename the ‘social visibility’ 
element as ‘social distinction.’”).  
 168. See generally UNHCR Brief, supra note 117, at 5–10 (arguing that the 
BIA misinterpreted the UNHCR guidelines); Casper et al., supra note 152, at 
20; Marouf, supra note 75, at 70–71 (comparing the BIA’s “social visibility” in-
terpretation to the UNHCR guidelines). Contra Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. at 247–49 (asserting that recent decisions “more accurately capture[] the 
concepts underlying the United States’ obligations under the Protocol”). 
 169. See generally BENJAMIN CASPER, “PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” LITI-
GATION IN THE WAKE OF S-E-G- 5–11 (Kate Evans ed., 2012), http://www 
.ilcm.org/documents/litigation/ILCM_Nov_2012_CLE_Advisory_PSG_litigation
.pdf (suggesting “social visibility” under S-E-G- is unworkable, contrary to 
Acosta, and contrary to Congressional policy); NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, su-
pra note 19, at 7–9; Casper et al., supra note 152, at 22; Marouf, supra note 
75, at 68–70 (arguing that Chevron deference is improper due to the BIA’s con-
flicting positions). Contra Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244–47 
(claiming the BIA analyzed social visibility and particularity in cases prior to 
the official formulation of those tests). 
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the relevant society. Section B takes the problems presented in 
Section A and analyzes the evidentiary requirements necessary 
to satisfy the particular social group standard. This analysis 
concludes that pro se applicants will be unable to satisfy these 
new evidentiary requirements.  
A. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PARTICULARITY AND SOCIAL  
DISTINCTION 
Asylum applicants—and even experienced immigration at-
torneys—find it difficult to formulate a particular social group 
that satisfies both particularity and social distinction. The 
more a particular social group is defined with particularity, the 
greater the risk that it lacks social distinction. This section 
looks at the interplay between these two elements. Subsection 
1 analyzes the BIA’s requirements for particularity, ultimately 
concluding that the criterion no longer satisfies its initial goal 
of demarcating who is and who is not a member of a particular 
social group. Subsection 2 combines the analysis of particulari-
ty from Subsection 1 and pairs it with social distinction. It con-
cludes that the resulting dilemma is a game of semantics that 
pro se asylum applicants are unequipped to play. 
1. “Amorphous, Overbroad, Diffuse, or Subjective” Particular  
Social Groups 
Under the BIA’s interpretation of particularity, an appli-
cant cannot define her particular social group with characteris-
tics that are “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”170 
The applicant must define the particular social group “by char-
acteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who 
falls within the group.”171 A well-defined particular social group 
will permit an adjudicator to determine group membership 
without a linguistic analysis of the words used to define the 
group. The BIA has determined that words such as “affluent,”172 
“young,”173 and “poverty”174 are too subjective and amorphous to 
satisfy the criteria of particularity. Instead, the BIA requires 
applicants to define particular social groups with concrete, dis-
crete parameters.175 An age range replaces “young.”176 A mone-
 
 170. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
 171. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 172. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 173. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–87 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 174. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239–40 (citing Escobar v. Gon-
zales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 175. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 5.  
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tary income figure replaces “affluent” or “poverty.”177 Concrete 
parameters make it simple for an adjudicator to place individu-
als inside or outside of the group. 
Even seemingly well-defined terms, however, are not safe 
from the scrutiny of particularity. In W-G-R-, the BIA reasoned 
that “former [gang] members” could include “persons of any 
age, sex, or background,” without regard to how long the indi-
vidual had remained a member of the gang.178 The respondent 
had been a member of the gang “for less than a year” when he 
left and was shot as a consequence of leaving.179 Nothing in the 
facts indicates that the respondent’s age, sex, background, or 
length of membership influenced his persecution. “Former gang 
member” should thus satisfy particularity because it has defin-
able boundaries: those who have been initiated into a gang and 
have subsequently left.180 Because “former gang member” has 
definable boundaries, the BIA’s call to define the group with 
“respect to the duration or strength of the members’ active par-
ticipation in the activity” should be inapplicable to the formula-
tion of a particular social group.181 Similarly, in M-E-V-G-, the 
BIA suggested that “landowners” may be discrete in an “under-
developed, oligarchical society,” but “would likely be far too 
amorphous to meet the particularity requirement in Canada.”182 
A group of landowners, however, “has clear boundaries based 
on a common definition; it just may be large and diverse.”183 
It is unclear why the BIA rejected “former gang members” 
and “landowners” if the purpose of particularity is truly to “de-
lineate” who is and who is not a member of a particular social 
group.184 Scholars have attacked this rejection of “overbroad” 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 179. Id. at 209. 
 180. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 241 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing 
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)) (“‘[P]articularity’ 
chiefly addresses the ‘outer limits’ of a group’s boundaries and is definitional 
in nature . . . .”). 
 181. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221–22. 
 182. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241. 
 183. Casper et al., supra note 152. 
 184. Compare Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214 (“‘Particularity’ 
chiefly addresses the question of delineation . . . .”), and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (stating that “‘particularity’ chiefly addresses the ‘outer 
limits’ of a group’s boundaries and is definitional in nature”), with Casper et 
al., supra note 152, at 20 (explaining that the BIA “limits social group asylum 
claims by creating standards for particularity and social visibility that work in 
opposition to each other”). 
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categories as contrary to the BIA’s own interpretations of par-
ticularity and the statute.185 No other ground of protection 
(race, religion, political opinion, or nationality) requires these 
precise boundaries or an evaluation of the strength of member-
ship.186 The BIA’s rejection of these concrete terms makes it dif-
ficult for asylum applicants and practitioners to ascertain 
which words they must avoid when framing a particular social 
group. With enough analysis, the BIA could reject any particu-
lar social group formulation as amorphous or subjective—other 
than those defined with statistical precision.187 Therefore, par-
ticularity requires an asylum applicant to define her particular 
social group with wording calculated to sustain judicial scruti-
ny. 
2. A Game of Semantics 
A particular social group formulation defined with the ut-
most particularity, however, is unlikely to satisfy the criterion 
of social distinction.188 When evaluating social distinction, the 
question is whether or not the society perceives the particular 
social group as a distinct group.189 An overly-particularized par-
ticular social group is unlikely to be able to meet this standard. 
A particular social group defined as “Guatemalans between the 
ages of 30 and 65, who earn over $65,000 a year” is discrete and 
likely satisfies the element of particularity. But, it is hard to 
imagine that society would perceive the group in those terms. 
The applicant would be required to prove that society perceives 
the group as distinct from 29-year-olds who makes $60,000 
year.190 “Young, affluent Guatemalans” is simply a more realis-
tic interpretation of society’s perception. While such a formula-
tion may be socially distinct, it would not satisfy the require-
ment of particularity. The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Rivera-
Barrientos v. Holder exemplifies this problem, finding that 
 
 185. See Casper et al., supra note 152, at 19–20. 
 186. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 7 (“The fact that the 
word ‘Catholic’ might be thought to apply either to devoted practitioners or to 
‘cultural’ members of the group would not preclude a religious-based claim 
where Catholicism was the basis of the persecution. Yet a ‘former gang mem-
ber’ group would not be cognizable simply because the boundaries of the group 
may be unclear (although possibly irrelevant to the claim).”). 
 187. Cf. id. at 5 (“[T]he BIA requires an asylum applicant to formulate a 
group in terms which are statistically precise, i.e., not using natural, common 
linguistic descriptors, and also commonly recognized.”). 
 188. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19. 
 189. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240. 
 190. Cf. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, (suggesting concrete pa-
rameters are necessary to satisfy particularity). 
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“women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who re-
sisted gang recruitment” satisfied the element of particularity, 
but was not socially visible.191  
Supporters of social distinction and particularity may sug-
gest that the BIA intended to exclude groups not defined by 
gender or a highly-visible societal construct (e.g., ethnicity, 
tribe, etc.). This is not the case. First, in M-E-V-G- the BIA re-
asserted that “[s]ocial group determinations are made on a 
case-by-case basis” and reaffirmed that its decisions in S-E-G- 
and E-A-G- are not a “blanket rejection of all factual scenarios 
involving gangs.”192 Second, since the inception of social visibil-
ity and particularity, circuit courts have recognized particular 
social groups framed around government witnesses, truckers 
who refuse to cooperate with insurgent groups, and other 
groups not defined by gender or societal constructs.193 The BIA 
has not closed the possibility of asylum to any specific group. 
Instead, social distinction and particularity create unfathoma-
ble barriers for groups, otherwise entitled to asylum, to over-
come. Furthermore, an attempt by the BIA to restrict the defi-
nition of particular social group in this way would be contrary 
to the United States’ obligations under international law and 
prior interpretations of domestic law.194 
The above observations suggest that word choice is the key 
to a good particular social group formulation. Unfortunately, 
most asylum applicants lack the necessary English skills to 
participate in this game of semantics.195 The courts have 
 
 191. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 647, 650, 653 (10th Cir. 
2012); see also Casper et al., supra note 152, at 20 (noting that Rivera-
Barrientos illustrates the tension between the social particularity requirement 
and visibility requirement). 
 192. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 251. 
 193. See, e.g., Garcia v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 503–04 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (concerning witnesses who have assisted the government in testify-
ing against gang violence); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 
2011) (recognizing “truckers who, because of their anti-FARC views and ac-
tions, have collaborated with law enforcement and refused to cooperate with 
FARC”); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
former military officers as a particular social group, but denying the applicant 
asylum for failure to establish a nexus between his membership in that group 
and his persecution); see also KURZBAN, supra note 81 (listing cases that have 
found particular social groups in the past). 
 194. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
 195. Cf. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC 
TRAINING COURSE: INTERVIEWING PART VI: WORKING WITH AN INTERPRETER 5 
(2006) [hereinafter USCIS INTERVIEWING] (“While some applicants can speak 
English well enough to be interviewed in English without the use of an inter-
preter, most applicants need an interpreter during the interview.”). 
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acknowledged that asylum applicants are frequently “poor, il-
literate people who do not speak English and are unable to re-
tain counsel.”196  
In the affirmative process, asylum applicants must provide 
their own interpreter (a “family member, friend, or other per-
son associated with the [Limited English Proficiency] person”) 
“at no expense to the Government.”197 Unfortunately, “[n]early 
all of these interpreters are not professionally trained and they 
do not have experience translating in formal settings.”198 Accu-
rate interpretation is crucial where the interpretation of a spe-
cific word, with discrete connotations in the applicant’s own 
language, may be interpreted into an English word the asylum 
officer would find amorphous or vague. 
This presupposes, however, that the applicant will under-
stand the interplay between particularity and social distinction 
well enough to carefully craft her particular social group in the 
first place. The asylum application and its instructions do not 
list the elements of a particular social group, nor do they pro-
vide a designated space for the applicant to describe their par-
ticular social group.199 While asylum applicants may obtain a 
rudimentary understanding of social visibility and particularity 
from non-profit published resources, these resources are not 
substitutes for an experienced immigration attorney.200 
Even the most experienced immigration attorneys struggle 
to define a particular social group with particularity and social 
distinction.201 If an applicant defines her particular social group 
with the requisite statistical and calculated particularity, she 
risks being unable to meet the requirement of social distinction. 
The BIA’s arbitrary rejection of particular social groups with 
seemingly concrete membership (e.g., “former gang members” 
and “landowners”) further complicates this problem. The BIA 
cannot expect pro se applicants to engage in this game of se-
 
 196. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 197. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DRAFT LANGUAGE ACCESS 
PLAN 4 (2014). 
 198. Dree K. Collopy, Lost in Translation: Why Professional Interpreters 
Are Critical in Asylum Interviews¸ 27 IMMIGR. L. TODAY, no. 3, May–June 
2008, at 12, 14. 
 199. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB No. 1615-0067, I-
589, APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 5–6 
(2012); I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2. 
 200. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, supra note 38, at 9–
10. 
 201. See Casper et al., supra note 152, at 20 (noting the special difficulty of 
bringing “particular social group” asylum claims). 
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mantics. The complexity of this game, risk of misinterpretation, 
and lack of comprehensive resources makes it more likely for 
deserving individuals to be denied asylum not on merit, but on 
account of a technicality. 
B. THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEMS OBTAINING IT 
Supposing an applicant arrives at an acceptable particular 
social group formulation that survives the semantic require-
ments of social distinction and particularity, the applicant will 
still need to provide evidence of social distinction. Subsection 1 
analyzes the need for sociological evidence—as W-G-R- and A-
R-C-G- demonstrate through their consideration of presented 
evidence. Subsection 2 suggests that only expert evidence will 
be able to satisfy this need. As this section ultimately con-
cludes, pro se applicants are generally unable to obtain expert 
witnesses—let alone any corroborating evidence—thereby mak-
ing it difficult for them to satisfy social distinction’s evidentiary 
requirements.  
1. The Need for Sociological Evidence 
The applicant’s need for sociological evidence supporting 
social distinction is the greatest difference between S-E-G- and 
M-E-V-G-. In S-E-G-, the BIA refused to accept particular so-
cial groups that “would necessitate a sociological analysis as to 
how persons . . . would have been viewed by others in their 
country.”202 In contrast, M-E-V-G- requires the applicant to pre-
sent evidence of social distinction, i.e., that the group is per-
ceived by the society in question.203 Now, social distinction re-
quires adjudicators to engage in a “sociological analysis” to 
assess the sufficiency of group perception. This evidentiary re-
quirement imposes unnecessary burdens on applicants—in par-
ticular pro se applicants who cannot obtain evidence that is 
able to satisfy the requirements of social distinction. 
Shortly after the BIA decided S-E-G-, Professor Fatma 
Marouf argued that IJs are not suited for sociological analy-
sis.204 Drawing from studies in social psychology, Marouf con-
cluded that “social perception depends not only on the identity 
of the perceiver, but the emotional states of the perceiver and 
the perceived at any given moment, as well as the interactions 
 
 202. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (quoting Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 203. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 241–44 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 204. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 71–78. 
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that group members have had in the past.”205 Simply put, “the 
complexity of the human mind can never be captured in a lim-
ited legal proceeding.”206 Unfortunately, social distinction forces 
adjudicators to analyze the “mind” of a broader society. 
The asylum applicant has the burden to establish through 
sufficient corroborative country condition evidence that the 
formulated particular social group satisfies social distinction.207 
The BIA has provided little guidance to help applicants ascer-
tain what evidence may establish social distinction. The discus-
sion in M-E-V-G- suggests that applicants should provide 
“country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and 
press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical 
animosities, and the like.”208 However, asylum applicants tradi-
tionally provide these forms in any asylum application. The 
BIA has done little to substantiate what information within 
these sources would illustrate social distinction.  
W-G-R- and A-R-C-G- contain some discussion of these evi-
dentiary requirements. In W-G-R-, the applicant provided re-
ports showing that Salvadoran society recognized former gang 
members because of their distinct tattoos.209 The BIA, however, 
rejected this particular social group because reports indicated 
that Salvadoran society discriminated against “a broader swath 
of young people” suspected of gang membership, not just former 
gang members.210 Furthermore, the BIA concluded that nothing 
in the State Department reports suggested that former gang 
members were socially distinct.211 W-G-R- evidences two trends. 
First, the evidence must show that the persecution is limited to 
the articulated group and not any broader (e.g., targeting only 
former gang members and not youth perceived as gang mem-
bers). The BIA fails to realize, however, that there is no reason 
that former gang members and youth perceived as gang mem-
bers could not constitute two separate particular social groups, 
as gangs persecute the former, and society or specific elements 
 
 205. Id. at 72. 
 206. Id. at 78. 
 207. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“The burden of proof is on the applicant to 
. . . establish that . . . membership in a particular social group . . . was or will 
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”); accord Matter of 
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244; In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 
1997) (“The absence of such corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that 
an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof.”). 
 208. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244. 
 209. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 222 (B.I.A. 2014).  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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within the society (e.g., police, vigilante groups, and rival 
gangs) persecute the latter. As a second trend, the BIA gives 
greater deference to State Department reports than to the ap-
plicant’s own evidence.  
A-R-C-G- presents an interesting lens with which to ana-
lyze evidentiary requirements, as it is the first and only prece-
dential example where the applicant proved social distinction. 
News articles showing that Guatemala has a culture of “ma-
chismo and family violence” persuaded the BIA that “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation-
ship” were socially distinct.212 Unlike in W-G-R-, the State De-
partment reports supported social distinction because they re-
vealed that the Guatemalan government fails to prosecute 
domestic violence crimes.213 More generally, the BIA said in 
cases of domestic violence it would look for evidence of “wheth-
er the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection 
to victims of domestic violence, including whether the country 
has criminal laws designed to protect domestic abuse victims, 
whether those laws are effectively enforced, and other sociopo-
litical factors.”214 A-R-C-G- reaffirms the importance of the 
State Department reports—in the eyes of the BIA—in as-
sessing social distinction. More perplexing, though, is that the 
BIA relied on more generalized evidence (i.e., news articles) in 
A-R-C-G- compared to the specific well-studied reports cited in 
W-G-R-.215 This observation raises concerns that the BIA incon-
sistently weighs evidence. However, this Note cannot evaluate 
this claim with the limited sample size of BIA cases currently 
available. 
2. The Necessary Evidence 
Ultimately, few conclusions can be drawn about what evi-
dence persuasively illustrates social distinction. References to 
the harmed group in the State Department reports appear to be 
the most persuasive form of evidence to the BIA. State De-
partment reports, however, are conclusory and “risk carrying ‘a 
weight they do not deserve’ because they may oversimplify the 
relationship between political conditions, human rights abuses, 
 
 212. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–94 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 213. See id. at 393–94. 
 214. Id. at 394. 
 215. Compare id. at 393–94 (citing the State Department report and tan-
gentially related news articles), with Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 222 
(citing HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLAN-
DESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 101 (2007)). 
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and the particular situation of the applicant.”216 State Depart-
ment reports cannot describe every problem in a society, which 
may lead an adjudicator to believe the problem does not exist. 
Nor do the reports provide citations to other sources or infor-
mation about how facts are gathered. The applicant is not pro-
vided with a meaningful opportunity to rebut the evidence pre-
sented in the State Department report. As the Eighth Circuit 
recognized in Banat v. Holder: 
  Reliance on reports of investigations that do not provide sufficient 
information about how the investigation was conducted are funda-
mentally unfair because, without that information, it is nearly impos-
sible for the immigration court to assess the report’s probative value 
and the asylum applicant is not allowed a meaningful opportunity to 
rebut the investigation’s allegations.217 
Even so, certain IJs have denied asylum applications as a 
result of information obtained from unofficial sources that are 
just as vague and hard to verify—namely Wikipedia.218 
Applicants must carefully select additional country condi-
tion information from news articles, non-governmental organi-
zations, and similar print sources and be able to explain how 
the evidence relates to social distinction. An adjudicator may 
quickly dispose of social distinction if the evidence suggests 
that the group is broader than the formulated particular social 
group. However, in some cases, the persecution may be un-
derreported internationally or in the society in question. In 
such cases, the applicant may have a difficult time finding evi-
 
 216. Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum 
Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
197, 211 (2000). 
 217. Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 218. See, e.g., Sibanda v. Holder, 778 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2015) (cita-
tions omitted) (“During the hearing, he quizzed [the applicant] about the cus-
tom of bride-price, comparing her answers to a Wikipedia article he had in 
front of him. But we have no way of knowing what that article said or how re-
liable it was, and it appears that the IJ never shared the article with [the ap-
plicant]. Asylum regulations and case law invite IJs to consider reports pro-
duced by the State Department and other credible sources in evaluating 
country conditions. Although the IJ was not required to obtain country reports 
on his own initiative, . . . because the IJ already had found the Wikipedia en-
try, he could just as easily have retrieved more reliable country reports and 
properly put them into the record.”); Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 643–44 
(7th Cir. 2013) (“As a means of testing religious belief, IJ Zerbe questioned 
Singh on the tenets of Sikhism using information gathered from Wikipe-
dia. . . . IJ Zerbe . . . seemed only interested in answers that parroted back the 
exact language of the Wikipedia entry . . . . IJ Zerbe’s behavior was inappro-
priate. . . . Rather than seeking a verbatim recitation of an encyclopedia arti-
cle, IJs should listen to a petitioner’s personal explanation of religious be-
liefs.”). 
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dence to establish that society, not solely the persecutor, recog-
nizes the particular social group.219 Country conditions are lim-
ited to what has been published, and the adjudicator is accord-
ed significant deference in choosing how to interpret the 
provided material.  
Given the scrutiny under which the BIA has examined cor-
roborative country condition evidence, most cases will require 
the assistance of an expert witness. The NIJC encourages at-
torneys to use “academics or professionals with substantial 
scholarly credentials” as expert witnesses to establish social 
distinction whenever possible.220 An expert witness can provide 
sociological evidence that distinguishes the applicant’s particu-
lar social group from the society as a whole. An expert is also 
more likely to prevent the adjudicator from conducting her own 
sociological analysis, instead synthesizing the expert’s own 
knowledge with the provided country conditions and the facts 
of the applicant’s case to explain to the adjudicator how the 
particular social group is recognizable to the society in ques-
tion.221 
The expert witness is the strongest tool an applicant has in 
proving social distinction.222 Unfortunately, most pro se appli-
cants cannot afford to hire counsel, let alone an expert wit-
ness.223 Therefore, in most cases, a pro se applicant will be lim-
ited to evidence brought from her home country or found in 
documented sources. In many cases, the applicant may only be 
able to provide her testimony. 
Even USCIS’s own guidelines admit that asylum appli-
cants—and experts, such as human rights monitors—have dif-
ficulty obtaining corroborative evidence. According to USCIS, 
“[t]he most common form of evidence that informs asylum eligi-
 
 219. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) (requir-
ing the perception to be of the society in question, not the persecutor). 
 220. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 10. 
 221. Cf. Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I. & N. Dec. 169, 176 (B.I.A. 2010) 
(“Immigration Judges, like other trial judges generally, are often required to 
determine factual disputes regarding matters on which they possess little or 
no knowledge or substantive expertise, and, in making such determinations, 
they typically rely on evidence, including expert testimony, presented by the 
parties.”). 
 222. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 10 (describing the in-
creasing importance of country condition experts in asylum cases). 
 223. One source estimates that the average cost of a non-medical expert 
witness ranges from $275 to $322 per hour, depending on the services provid-
ed. Joe O’Neill, Expert Witness Fees: An Infographic, THE EXPERT INST. (Sept. 
23, 2014), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fees/. 
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bility is the applicant’s own testimony.”224 USCIS acknowledges 
that “[b]ecause of the circumstances that give rise to flight, asy-
lum applicants often will not be able to provide documentary 
evidence.”225 The Seventh Circuit too has stated that “[t]o ex-
pect [an applicant] to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork be-
fore fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the 
harrowing conditions they face.”226 Persecutors usually “do not 
provide evidence of their persecution.”227 “Human rights moni-
tors and reporters may have difficulty documenting abuses in 
some refugee-producing countries that do not allow human 
rights monitors access to the country and maintain firm control 
over the press.”228 Given USCIS’s acknowledgement of the diffi-
culties in obtaining general corroborating evidence, it is unrea-
sonable to require pro se applicants to obtain evidence support-
ing societal perception. The evidentiary requirements of social 
distinction ignore the difficulties applicants—and even ex-
perts—have in obtaining satisfactory sociological evidence.  
Pro se applicants may not even realize the need to provide 
such in-depth evidence. The asylum application instructions in-
form the applicant to “submit reasonably available corrobora-
tive evidence showing (1) the general conditions in the country 
from which you are seeking asylum . . . .”229 As explained above, 
societal perception is not found in “general” country conditions. 
An objective reading of the above requirement suggests appli-
cants should submit news articles, government reports, and the 
like; not sociological expert testimony on societal group percep-
tion. And, an applicant is unlikely to have notice that they will 
be questioned regarding the societal perception of their pro-
posed group, as the elements of a particular social group are 
not listed in the instructions.230  
The BIA cannot realistically expect asylum applicants to 
produce expert witnesses at removal proceedings or asylum in-
terviews, especially when it barely provides notice of the evi-
dentiary requirements of social distinction in the first place. 
The evidentiary requirements of social distinction ignore the 
economic and social situations from which most refugees come. 
Even USCIS has acknowledged the difficulties applicants have 
 
 224. USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 16. 
 225. Id. at 19. 
 226. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 227. USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 19.  
 228. Id. 
 229. I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 7.  
 230. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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in obtaining general country condition information.231 The af-
firmative asylum process alleviates some of this burden by re-
quiring the asylum officer to “provide background country con-
ditions information through sources such as Refworld, the 
USCIS intranet, the Asylum Division Virtual Library, and oth-
ers.”232 These traditional forms of documentary evidence, how-
ever, rarely contain evidence of social distinction tailored to 
specific particular social groups. Furthermore, the BIA requires 
defensive applicants to provide their own country condition ev-
idence. A system of precedential country condition fact-finding 
may alleviate some of these evidentiary burdens on pro se asy-
lum applicants. 
III.  ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF GUIDANCE DECISIONS   
Critics of social distinction and particularity have called for 
a reformed standard. In particular, they advocate for a return 
to the Acosta standard as the only way to eliminate the preju-
dice caused to pro se applicants.233 The BIA, however, refuses to 
abrogate the social distinction and particularity elements.234 
While the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, or Congress could 
overturn the BIA precedents in M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, such a 
solution seems unlikely at this time. Instead, the BIA should 
adopt an alternative system of precedential fact-finding to alle-
viate the burden on pro se applicants. Section A describes how 
the United States could adopt a system similar to the United 
Kingdom’s Country Guidance system. This proposed system 
would permit the BIA to issue precedential decisions based on 
commonly reoccurring situations in asylum adjudications. Sec-
 
 231. See USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43 at 29 (explaining that 
an applicant “may not understand which documents are relevant to his or her 
claim,” and that “there generally is insufficient time for an applicant to pro-
vide any additional documentation that may take more than a short period of 
time to access”). 
 232. Id. at 23. 
 233. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 152, at 22 (“Other options for advo-
cacy could include asking the Attorney General to certify an appropriate case 
in order to roll back the Board’s flawed social group precedents, seeking a so-
cial group regulation consistent with Acosta, or pursuing a legislative fix.”); 
Marouf, supra note 75, at 104 (“Adjudicators could easily avoid such chaos by 
remaining true to Acosta’s law-based standard.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014) 
(“[W]e adhere to the social group requirements announced in Matter of S-E-G- 
and Matter of E-A-G-, as further explained here . . . . We believe that these re-
quirements provide guidance to courts and those seeking asylum based on 
‘membership in a particular social group,’ are necessary to address the evolv-
ing nature of claims asserted on this ground of persecution, and are essential 
to ensuring the consistent nationwide adjudication of asylum claims.”). 
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tion B responds to possible critiques of this system, concluding 
that the benefits of the proposed system, despite imperfections, 
offer significant improvements over the current absence of pro-
tection for pro se asylum applicants. 
A. A SYSTEM OF UNITED STATES GUIDANCE DECISIONS 
In his opinion in Banks v. Gonzales, Judge Easterbrook 
stated, “An IJ is not an expert on conditions in any given coun-
try, and a priori views about how authoritarian regimes con-
duct themselves are no substitute for evidence—a point that we 
have made repeatedly, but which has yet to sink in.”235 This 
need for a country condition expert in every case could be cir-
cumvented through the creation of precedential “Guidance De-
cisions” modeled after the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance 
System. 
Analysis of an actual Country Guidance Determination in 
the United Kingdom reveals the potential benefits of such deci-
sions. AMM Somalia concerned five asylum claims arising from 
risks of persecution from Al-Shabab and FGM.236 The Tribunal 
began by broadly describing the humanitarian crisis in various 
regions of Somalia.237 Following this, the Tribunal spent 327 
paragraphs weighing the oral testimony of the 5 appellants, 2 
expert witnesses, and 1266 documents of background evi-
dence.238 Having critiqued the presented evidence, the Tribunal 
laid out a succinct statement of fact-finding and the legal impli-
cations of that finding.239 The Tribunal’s FGM guidance is illus-
trative of how the Country Guidance Determination informs 
the lower courts to apply the fact-finding: 
  The risk will be greatest in cases where both parents are in favour 
of FGM. Where both are opposed, the question of whether the risk 
will reach the requisite level will need to be determined by reference 
to the extent to which the parents are likely to be able to withstand 
the strong societal pressures. Unless the parents are from a socio-
economic background that is likely to distance them from mainstream 
social attitudes, or there is some other particular feature of their case, 
the fact of parental opposition may well as a general matter be inca-
 
 235. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 236. See AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445, [54] (IAC) (stating the scope 
of the decision). 
 237. Id. at [73]–[81]. 
 238. See id. at [241]–[567]; id. at app. 1 [1]–[146] (summarizing the testi-
mony of each appellant, one appellant’s partner, and two expert witnesses); id. 
at app. 2 [1]–[1266] (listing all of the documentary evidence provided). 
 239. See id. at [594]–[610] (providing the Country Guidance Determination 
for Somalia). 
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pable of eliminating the real risk to the daughter that others (particu-
larly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on her.
240
 
Country Guidance Determinations accomplish three objec-
tives. First, they allow the Tribunal to consider a large amount 
of evidence and set standards for interpreting this evidence in 
future adjudications. As such, Country Guidance Determina-
tions eliminate the need for lower courts to weigh country con-
dition evidence in every decision. This promotes consistency 
from case to case. Second, they allow the Tribunal to consider 
many potentially related humanitarian issues at once. By join-
ing cases with similar, although somewhat different claims, the 
Tribunal may efficiently engage in broader country condition 
analysis. In contrast, the United States has had numerous asy-
lum cases arising from Somalia,241 none of which can draw on 
the previous country condition fact-finding of the others due to 
the case-by-case nature of United States asylum law.242 Third, 
the Country Guidance Determination narrows the focus of fu-
ture cases because it presents a succinct question by which the 
lower court should analyze similar claims. The Country Guid-
ance Determinations promote consistency and efficiency by 
eliminating the need to conduct country condition fact-finding 
in every case. 
A United States system of Guidance Decisions would alle-
viate some of the problems in analyzing evidence of social dis-
tinction.243 A proper analysis of social distinction necessarily re-
quires substantial documentary evidence and expert testimony. 
By combining similar claims into a single precedential fact-
finding case, the BIA can address reoccurring issues in one de-
cision. IJs and asylum officers will not need to analyze the 
country condition evidence in every case. Less fact-finding will 
result in quicker consideration and adjudication of asylum 
claims. Quicker adjudication will lessen the backlog of Immi-
 
 240. Id. at [610]. 
 241. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (recog-
nizing “Somali females” as a particular social group due to the prevalence of 
female genital mutilation); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(accepting the “Muuse Diriiye clan” as a particular social group); Matter of S-
A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464, 465–66 (B.I.A. 2008) (granting asylum to 
a mother and daughter subjected to female genital mutilation); In re H-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 337, 340–42 (B.I.A. 1996) (accepting the “Marehan subclan” as a 
particular social group). 
 242. Cf. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (“While Tay-
lor ruled Liberia, all ethnic Krahns (and Unity Party supporters) should have 
been treated the same way. . . . We remanded . . . because the agency had 
failed to confront that recurring question.”). 
 243. See supra Part II.B. 
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gration Court cases, which has risen from 113,702 pending cas-
es in 1998 (with an average wait time of 324 days) to 422,104 
cases in 2015 (with an average wait time of 627 days).244 More-
over, this would alleviate the burden on the applicant to pre-
sent sociological evidence in cases where the BIA has rendered 
a Guidance Decision. Pro se applicants would not need to hire 
expert witnesses or collect substantial documentary evidence. 
They would only need to provide evidence of their own personal 
persecution. 
Broadly, the proposed system would work as follows. The 
BIA would identify cases that are representative of a recurring 
issue in asylum adjudications and consolidate the appeals.245 In 
addition, the BIA would permit advocates to petition for a case 
or group of cases to be heard as a Guidance Decision. These 
cases would be heard at a single hearing, with all applicants 
and their counsel given a chance to present their arguments. 
The BIA would frame the proposed issue around (1) specific 
country conditions; (2) a particular social group; or (3) a wide-
spread form of persecution.246 For example, the BIA could issue 
decisions addressing when asylum is appropriate for victims of 
domestic violence,247 or which particular social groups may 
claim asylum due to Salvadoran gang persecution.248 The BIA 
would then notify the applicant, the government, and the pub-
lic that the case would be a Guidance Decision. The applicant 
and the government would create extensive evidentiary records 
supporting their respective arguments on the proposed issue. 
Academics and non-profits could submit comments and addi-
tional documentary evidence. The BIA would permit amici cu-
riae, such as the UNHCR, NIJC, and other non-profit organiza-
 
 244. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of 
Wait in Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ 
immigration/court_backlog/ (last updated Sept. 2015) (tracking the number of 
immigration-related charges from 1998 to 2015, excluding criminal/national 
security/terrorism charges). 
 245. Cf. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.10, at 66 (2015) 
(“[T]he Board may consolidate . . . appeals where the cases are sufficiently in-
terrelated.”). 
 246. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 511–14 (describing how the United 
Kingdom Tribunal identifies risk categories and risk factors in issuing country 
guidance). 
 247. Cf. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 (B.I.A. 2014) (describ-
ing the history of domestic violence-based asylum claims). 
 248. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (ac-
knowledging that scenarios may exist in which applicants facing gang-related 
persecution could be awarded asylum).  
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tions, to file briefs and present evidence.249 In circumstances in-
volving complex or broad issues, the BIA would permit amici 
curiae to present oral arguments.250 The BIA would then con-
sider all presented evidence at an oral hearing. 
The BIA would frame its Guidance Decision similar to the 
Tribunal’s decision in AMM Somalia. The BIA would begin 
with a thorough analysis of the evidence and its factual find-
ings. It would then issue a guideline for lower courts to adjudi-
cate similar issues. Because adjudicators evaluate claims on 
case-by-case basis and country conditions constantly evolve, 
this guideline would not be a strict rule but a measurement of 
when a case satisfies the requirements of asylum. An example 
of this is the FGM guideline in AMM Somalia, where the Tri-
bunal instructs lower courts to examine the parents’ opinions of 
FGM.251 The purpose of such formulations is to draw the in-
quiry away from the country conditions generally and to the 
applicant’s own personal situation. The resulting Guidance De-
cision would bind “all officers and employees of the Department 
of Homeland Security or immigration judges in the administra-
tion of the immigration laws of the United States . . . .”252  
The basic regulatory structure for this system already ex-
ists.253 The Department of Justice would need to amend current 
regulations to allow the BIA to engage in fact-finding and pro-
vide structure for the Guidance Decision process. Under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3), the BIA is prohibited from engaging in de 
novo review of facts or engaging in fact-finding.254 The Depart-
 
 249. See BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, supra note 245, § 2.10, at 30 (“The Board 
may grant permission to an amicus curiae to appear, on a case-by-case basis, 
when it serves the public interest.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(d) (2014) (per-
mitting the appearance of amicus curiae). 
 250. Cf. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, supra note 245, § 8.7(e)(xiii), at 104 
(“Amicus curiae may present oral argument only upon advance permission of 
the Board.”). 
 251. AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445, [610] (IAC). 
 252. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2014). 
 253. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (citing federal regula-
tions describing the BIA’s standard of review). 
 254. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(iv) (“The Board will not engage in de 
novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. . . . [T]he 
Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.”). This 
Note is not oblivious to the burdens the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
poses to administrative rulemaking. Some commentators have deemed the 
regulatory process confusing and circular, leading to many dead ends. See 
Maxwell Mensinger, Note, Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive Lan-
guage That Grounded the Unmanned Industry Should Cease to Govern It, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 405, 409, 433 (2015); Samuel D. Posnick, Note, A Merry-Go-
Round of Metal and Manipulation: Toward a New Framework for Commodity 
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ment of Justice would need to amend the regulation to allow for 
fact-finding in Guidance Decisions. The regulations would re-
strict the use of precedential fact-finding to country conditions 
in asylum cases. After the BIA issues a Guidance Decision, the 
BIA would remand the case to the IJ for further review in con-
formance with the recent decision.255 The Department of Justice 
will also need to promulgate rules permitting the use of Guid-
ance Decisions and describing when the BIA should issue such 
decisions. The rule, however, must allow the BIA wide discre-
tion in choosing when to use Guidance Decisions. 
Guidance Decisions result in efficient and consistent adju-
dications of asylum cases. In commonly reoccurring cases the 
BIA would be able to engage in broad fact-finding, saving IJs 
and asylum officers the trouble of having to hear expert testi-
mony and sort through thousands of pages of country condi-
tions evidence. Furthermore, this form of decision-making bet-
ter protects pro se applicants as it lessens the evidentiary 
burden on them. In a comprehensive Guidance Decision the 
BIA can identify socially distinct groups for future adjudica-
tions. While this solution is not a return to Acosta, it does alle-
viate some of the evidentiary burdens placed particularly upon 
pro se applicants. 
B. CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM AND SOLUTIONS TO  
ADDRESS THOSE CRITICISMS 
Critics drawing from the experience of the United Kingdom 
will note problems with this proposed system.256 Of course, such 
a system creates a demand for more judicial resources in the 
short-term, but the potential to clear the Immigration Court 
docket of years of backlogged cases and quick adjudication of 
common asylum claims renders this complaint moot.257 Aside 
from this complaint, however, this Note addresses two primary 
concerns. First, country conditions will change faster than the 
BIA can amend or change a Guidance Decision. Second, a poor-
ly-decided precedential decision affects more than just the pre-
sent applicant and has the potential to bar thousands of appli-
 
Exchange Self-Regulation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 441, 454–60 (2015). These pro-
cedural burdens, however, are inherent in any notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing procedure, and this Note therefore ignores them. 
 255. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (“If further factfinding is needed in a par-
ticular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to the immigration judge 
or, as appropriate, to the Service.”). 
 256. For further critiques of the United Kingdom Country Guidance sys-
tem, see generally IMMIGRATION ADVISORY SERVICE, supra note 70. 
 257. See supra Part III.A. 
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cants from obtaining asylum. Despite the risk of careless deci-
sion-making, this Guidance Decision system remains the only 
way of insulating pro se applicants from the troubles of proving 
social distinction—other than by an abrogation of particularity 
and social distinction through judicial or congressional action. 
1. Changing Country Conditions 
“[C]ountry guidance is always at the risk of becoming—or 
appearing to become—out of date.”258 Country conditions 
change faster than the United States immigration system can 
respond to them. A coup in a country could suddenly entitle 
thousands of refugees, who under a previous Guidance Decision 
would be ineligible, to asylum. Of the two presented counter-
arguments against a United States system of Guidance Deci-
sions, this is the least troublesome. Practically, if such a severe 
refugee crisis would call for immediate action, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security may protect such refugees by granting 
them Temporary Protected Status, until such time that the BIA 
may reconsider its previous Guidance Decision.259 Moreover, the 
BIA could implement safeguards to ensure that Guidance Deci-
sions do not prevent IJs from deciding in favor of otherwise 
qualified asylum applicants. 
First, Guidance Decisions would be authoritative guidance 
as long as the case “(a) relates to the country guidance issue in 
question; and (b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.”260 
Yet country conditions will change, forcing IJs to decide cases 
contrary to prior Guidance Decisions. “No judicial decision has 
the power of crystallizing the facts of the real world to an ex-
tent where not reality, but what has been said about it is the 
guide.”261 Adjudicators, however, must still evaluate asylum 
applicantions on a “case-by-case basis” and can avoid being 
bound to obsolete Guidance Decisions.262 Applicants in removal 
proceedings, and the opposing counsel for ICE, have the oppor-
tunity to produce evidence showing that the original decision 
was wrongly decided, country conditions have changed, or the 
Guidance Decision is inapplicable to the applicant based on the 
 
 258. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505. 
 259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) (2012) (permitting Temporary Protected Sta-
tus designation in cases of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordi-
nary circumstances). 
 260. PRACTICE DIRECTIONS, supra note 68, ¶ 12.2. 
 261. LT Turkey CG, [2004] UKIAT 175, [3] (IAT). 
 262. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 227 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled 
on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
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individualized facts of the case.263 The BIA should not overturn 
IJ decisions where individualized facts warrant ignoring a 
Guidance Decision as a result of newly presented evidence that 
renders the Guidance Decision inapplicable to the applicant’s 
case, or out of date. The BIA, however, should overturn IJ deci-
sions that ignore Guidance Decisions that would otherwise pro-
tect the applicant. For example, suppose Matter of A-R-C-G- 
were a Guidance Decision establishing that the particular so-
cial group of “married women . . . who are unable to leave their 
relationship” satisfied all three elements of the particular social 
group standard in countries, such as Guatemala, that fail to 
protect women from domestic violence.264 The BIA should over-
turn any decision from an IJ concluding that “women who are 
unable to leave their relationship” is not socially distinct in 
Salvadoran society, if El Salvador also fails to protect women 
from domestic violence. 
Second, applicants would be free to challenge Guidance 
Decisions where the decision has been “superseded by a change 
in country conditions.”265 The BIA must be able to freely amend 
and abrogate Guidance Decisions as new evidence shows sub-
stantive changes in the country conditions. As the Court of Ap-
peal of England and Wales acknowledges, “‘no country guidance 
case is for ever’ [sic]; such decisions are always open to revision 
in the light of new facts—new either in the sense of being new-
ly ascertained or in the sense that they have arisen only since 
the decision was promulgated.”266 As such, the BIA would issue 
a new Guidance Decision in order to adapt its previous decision 
to changed circumstances. Until reconsideration is possible, IJs 
would continue to favorably decide asylum cases contrary to an 
otherwise unfavorable Guidance Decision, as discussed above. 
Finally, the BIA can tailor its Guidance Decisions to pre-
vent them from becoming “too rigid.”267 First, the BIA can in-
clude flexibility within the language of its Guidance Decisions 
 
 263. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 517 (“Country guidance cases should be 
applied except where they do not apply to the particular facts raised in a sub-
sequent appeal and they can properly be held inapplicable for legally adequate 
reasons, such as a change in country conditions. The country guidance system 
‘does not have the rigidity of legally binding precedent but has instead the 
flexibility to accommodate individual cases, changes, fresh evidence and . . . 
other circumstances.’”). 
 264. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 265. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505. 
 266. Id. at 517 (citing KH (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t 
[2008] EWCA Civ 887, [4] (Sedley LJ) (CA)). 
 267. Id. at 518. 
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to ensure that while most individuals may or may not be pro-
tected, the IJ has the discretion to find otherwise in any partic-
ular case. For example, while the United Kingdom Tribunal 
found that “Afghan Sikhs and Hindus are not at risk of . . . per-
secution . . . simply by reason of being members of those minor-
ity communities anywhere in Afghanistan,” the Tribunal made 
a point to note that certain individuals may still be subject to 
societal discrimination in their given communities.268 Second, 
the BIA can indicate whether or not a decision is likely to re-
quire revisiting in the near future.269 A Guidance Decision ana-
lyzing country conditions in a politically turbulent country is 
much more likely to need correction sooner than a Guidance 
Decision finding a particular social group for those subjected to 
a targeted form of persecution.270 For example, a Guidance De-
cision similar to Hassan v. Gonzales, which creates a particular 
social group for those who oppose FGM, is unlikely to require 
future amendment because a cultural practice such as FGM is 
unlikely to change in the near future and will never be an ac-
ceptable practice according to human rights law.271 Providing a 
temporal element to the Guidance Decisions informs IJs that a 
decision may soon become outdated as a result of shifting coun-
try conditions. Then, IJs know to more carefully examine evi-
dence to determine if an applicant who would be ineligible un-
der a preexisting Guidance Decision is now eligible as a result 
of changing country conditions. By flexibly framing the decision 
and acknowledging when it is likely to change, the BIA can 
create a malleable Guidance Decision that remains authorita-
tive, but allows IJs to adjust as new evidence emerges and 
when individualized facts warrant protection. 
2. Poor Precedent Prejudices Future Applicants 
The risk of poor precedent is the most dangerous aspect of 
the proposed system and must be addressed. Of course, appli-
 
 268. See SL and Others (Returning Sikhs and Hindus) Afghanistan CG 
[2005] UKIAT 00137, [76] (IAT). 
 269. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 519 (noting that the United Kingdom 
Tribunal occasionally indicates when its guidance may “soon be overtaken by 
events in the country concerned”). 
 270. See, e.g., id. (comparing country guidance cases relating to politically 
unstable countries like Iraq with country guidance cases relating to long-
standing issues such as female genital mutilation or persecution of religious 
minorities). 
 271. Cf. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 
Somali females who are threatened with female genital mutilation as a par-
ticular social group). 
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cants would be able to appeal to the circuit courts for errors of 
law. However, circuit courts, as shown throughout this Note, 
tend to be highly deferential to the BIA. Therefore, an appeal 
may not afford applicants substantial protection in the case of a 
bad decision.  
Poorly decided Guidance Decisions may affect a large 
group of future applicants—setting poor factual precedent for 
future cases.272 Because a poorly decided Guidance Decision 
may bar thousands from seeking asylum for any given reason, 
a United States system would necessarily require substantial 
public input. Indeed, advocates would reject the adoption of a 
system that does not allow for such input.273 The United States 
system would permit scholars, non-governmental actors, and 
other advocacy organizations to file amici curiae briefs with ad-
ditional evidentiary reports in support of their own conclusions. 
In this respect, the BIA would be forced to examine public 
commentary and an evidentiary record comprised of all availa-
ble country condition evidence.  
The procedure for gathering third-party evidence would be 
conducted in a manner similar to Administrative Procedure Act 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.274 The BIA would publish a 
notice in the Federal Register providing a timeframe for sub-
mission of documentary evidence.275 The BIA would permit le-
gal scholars, social scientists, non-profit organizations, other 
federal agencies, and interested individuals to submit articles, 
scholarly works, human rights reports, and other studies, 
which it would then consider at the adjudication. More influen-
tial and informed commentators—the NIJC, UNHCR, the State 
Department, and other non-profits and NGOs—would submit 
full amici curiae briefs and potentially present oral arguments 
before the BIA. Necessarily, the United States system must be 
inquisitorial in nature, allowing for the creation of a full record, 
but must also permit both the government and appellant to 
present their respective arguments before the BIA.  
 
 272. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505 (“Good country guidance presuppos-
es good country information.”). 
 273. Cf. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 13–17, Holder v. Gutierrez, No. 10-1542, cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1542_respondent_ 
amcu_nijc.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 274. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the process of notice-
and-comment rulemaking). 
 275. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be 
published in the Federal Register . . . .”). 
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Ultimately, the applicant’s counsel, non-profits, amici curi-
ae, and other interested parties have a duty to ensure the BIA 
reviews all potential evidence. The submission of documentary 
evidence by members of the public, amici curiae briefs, and po-
tentially the oral arguments of amici curiae would protect fu-
ture applicants from the present applicant’s ineffective counsel. 
Professor Robert Thomas acknowledges the risk a Guidance 
Decision system would present if the fact-finding “were strictly 
confined to the body of evidence presented before it by the par-
ties” in an adversarial system.276 For this reason, the BIA has a 
duty to develop the above-described procedures and widely ac-
cept amici curiae and publicly submitted documents, in addi-
tion to granting the most authoritative amici curiae time for 
oral arguments, when issuing a Guidance Decision. The partic-
ipation of a wide range of actors ensures that the BIA reviews 
all available evidence and preserves some notion of procedural 
due process. 
Pro se asylum applicants do not have the funds or know-
how to obtain the necessary sociological evidence—almost al-
ways from expert witnesses—to present a compelling asylum 
claim. Under the proposed system, amici curiae, as well as a 
skilled appellate immigration lawyer, have the opportunity to 
speak for a large class of people. Even if the BIA issues a poorly 
reasoned decision that denies the future pro se applicant relief, 
it is unlikely that said applicant would have been able to pro-
duce the requisite evidence anyway. And, arguably, the BIA al-
ready relies on unfavorable precedent to deny applicants with 
similar claims.277 Countless individuals, however, could be pro-
tected from the evidentiary burdens with the release of a bene-
ficial Guidance Decision. While the BIA must create procedures 
promoting an environment for fair adjudication, the onus is on 
skilled immigration attorneys and amici curiae to create a 
compelling record and strive for a beneficial country guidance 
determination. 
Currently, pro se applicants lack any protection from the 
burdens of the current evidentiary requirements of proving the 
existence of a particular social group. This proposed Guidance 
Decision system is just one method—with researchable results 
from the United Kingdom—to lessen these evidentiary bur-
dens. Without a return to Acosta, the BIA must put some prec-
 
 276. Thomas, supra note 23, at 509. 
 277. See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 249–51 (B.I.A. 2014) 
(relying heavily on Matter of S-E-G- and E-A-G- in assessing the proposed par-
ticular social group). 
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edential fact-finding regime in place to protect future appli-
cants. As discussed extensively in Part II, pro se applicants 
cannot be expected to produce the colossal record necessary to 
prove social distinction. This system places the duty of creating 
such an evidentiary record in the hands of a team of competent 
immigration lawyers and expert witnesses who can ensure pro-
tection for future asylum applicants. As Judge Easterbrook 
stated, “What cannot continue . . . is administrative refusal to 
take a stand on recurring questions, coupled with reliance on 
IJs to fill in for the expertise missing from the record.”278 
  CONCLUSION   
Indisputably, neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 
1980 Refugee Act adequately define “particular social group.” 
As the Third Circuit stated in Fatin v. INS: 
Both courts and commentators have struggled to define “particular 
social group.” Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost 
completely open-ended. Virtually any set including more than one 
person could be described as a “particular social group.” Thus, the 
statutory language standing alone is not very instructive.
279
 
Adjudicators need a standard to determine whether or not 
individuals are members in a particular social group. And, for 
over twenty years, Acosta provided that standard.280 Now, the 
BIA seeks to tighten the particular social group standard with 
the elements of particularity and social distinction. 
Yet pro se applicants cannot successfully play the game of 
semantics that emerges as a result of the interplay between 
particularity and social distinction. If an applicant avoids the 
wrath of particularity by defining her particular social group 
with statistical precision, she will struggle to find sufficient so-
ciological evidence supporting the recognition of that particular 
social group in the society in question. Social distinction and 
particularity erect evidentiary barriers that pro se asylum ap-
plicants cannot be expected to overcome. This Note’s proposed 
solution of Guidance Decisions is a practical system that will 
alleviate some of the burden on pro se applicants. Such a sys-
tem will lessen the evidentiary burden by creating precedential 
fact-finding cases, thereby reducing the amount of country con-
dition evidence that will need to be produced by any individual 
asylum applicant. This Guidance Decision system better pro-
tects pro se applicants by providing them with a team of advo-
 
 278. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 279. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 280. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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cates. Experienced immigration attorneys and amici curiae can 
advocate at a Guidance Decision hearing not only for their own 
client, but also for future pro se applicants who may otherwise 
be denied protection due to evidentiary pitfalls. Until the BIA 
implements such a system, pro se applicants will continue to 
lose this game of social group semantics. 
 
